Verification and Validation of Adaptive and Intelligent Systems with Flight Test Results by Larson, Richard R. & Burken, John J.
1 April, 2009 
Verification and Validation of 
Adaptive and Intelligent Systems 
with Flight Test Results 
John Burken & Dick Larson 
NASA, Dryden Flight Research Center 
Edwards CA USA 
UCAUV 2009 
3 &4 April 2009 
Bangalore, India 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20090015898 2019-08-30T06:47:52+00:00Z
2 April, 2009 
Outline 
•  Background Information 
–  Problem statement 
•  Project Goals / Objectives 
–  Motivation 
•  System Overview Architecture 
•  Adaptive Control System Design 
–  Neural Network Approach 
•  Flight Approach 
•  V&V Task 
–  Loads 80% 
–  G load limits Pilot limits +/- (self imposed)  
•  Flight Results 
3 April, 2009 
Background Information 
Problem Statement  
•  How do you V&V a Piloted Adaptive system? 
•  Constraints: 
–  Piloted aircraft (Modified F-15) 
•  Pilot limited any transients to +/-.5 lateral gees & +/-2 longitudinal. 
–  Flight Control Computers (quad system) (Level A) 
–  The adaptive algorithms are processed on a single string 
system called ARTSII (Level B) 
–  Any maneuver can not exceed 80% structural load limit. 
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F-15 IFCS Project Goals 
•  Demonstrate Control Approaches that can 
Efficiently Optimize Aircraft Performance in both 
Normal and Failure Conditions [A] & [B] failures.  
•  Advance Neural Network-Based Flight Control 
Technology for New Aerospace Systems Designs 
with a Pilot in the Loop 
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Gen II Objectives 
•  Implement and Fly a Direct Adaptive Neural Network Based 
Flight Controller 
•  Demonstrate the Ability of the System to Adapt to 
Simulated System Failures 
–  Suppress Transients Associated with Failure 
–  Re-Establish Sufficient Control and Handling of Vehicle for 
Safe Recovery 
•  Provide Flight Experience for Development of Verification 
and Validation Processes for Flight Critical Neural Network 
Software  
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Motivation 
These are survivable accidents 
IFCS has potential to 
reduce the amount of 
skill and luck required 
for survival 
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Canards
•  ARTS II  computer for added 
computational capability 
(Neural Network algorithm)
•  Quadraplex 
digital flight control 
system
•  No mechanical or 
analog backup
•  Research control 
law processor 
(Enhanced Mode)
NASA NF-15B Tail Number 837 
Extensively modified F-15 airframe 
•  Thrust 
vectoring 
nozzles
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V & V Issues 
•  System Overview Architecture 
  Quad digital flight control computers (Level A) 
•  Airborne Research Test System II (ARTSII)  (single string 
Level B) 
•  Project tried to prove stability issues using Lyapunov 
methods for V&V but was not conclusive. 
•  Assumptions: 
–  Single string signals may go hard over any time. 
–  Note: If you had a dual redundant ARTSII the V&V task 
would be different then this projects V&V. 
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Limited Authority System 
•  Adaptation algorithm 
implemented in separate 
processor 
–  Class B software 
–  Autocoded directly from Simulink 
block diagram 
–  Many configurable settings 
•  Learning rates 
•  Weight limits 
•  Thresholds, etc. 
•  Control laws programmed in 
Class A, quad-redundant system 
•  Protection provided by floating 
limiter on adaptation signals 
Adaptive 
Algorithm  
Safety 
Limits 
Research Controller 
4 Channel 68040 
Single Channel 400 Mhz 
Conventional Controller 
Single String 
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ARTS II 
•  Provides Added Capacity (Throughput and Memory) to 
Run the IFCS Advanced Algorithms  
•  Airborne Research Test System II (ARTS II) 
–  VME Based System 
–  3 Single Board Computer (SBC) Processor Cards   
•  1553 Interface 
–  PowerPC 750  
•  400MHz Operating System  
•  66Mhz Local Bus 
–  1 MB L2/Cache 
–  128 MB of SDRAM 
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Flight Envelope 
For Gen 2  
Mach < 0.95 
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Flight Experiment 
•  Assess Handling Qualities of Gen II Controller 
without Adaptation 
•  Activate Adaptation and Assess Changes in 
Handling Qualities 
•  Introduce Simulated Failures 
–  Control Surface Locked (“B Matrix Failure”) 
–  Angle of Attack to Canard Feedback Gain Change (“A 
Matrix Failure”) 
•  Report on “Real World” Experience with a Neural 
Network Based Flight Control System 
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Direct Adaptive Neural Network 
Neural Network Design and Implementation for 
the F-15 837 
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• Motivation / Problem Statement  {The Big Picture}
• Land a damaged airplane or, return to a safe ejection site.
• General Goals & Objectives
• Flight evaluation of neural net software.
• Increased survivability in the presence of failures or aircraft damage. 
•  Increase your boundary of a flyable airplane.
• Increase your chances to see another day.
• Increase your chances to continue the mission. 
F-15 Intelligent Flight Control Systems 
18 April, 2009 
 Background : Historical Note 
•  Neural Networks are a subset of Adaptive Control. 
•  Adaptive Control Research Started in the early 1950’s. 
–  Auto-Pilot work (non-Neural Network). 
•  Research Diminished due to the crash of X-15. 
–  Reference: Eugene Lavretsky, “Adaptive Control: Introduction, Overview, 
and Applications.” 
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•  Why Use a Neural Network? 
•  How much do Neural Networks help a controller? 
•  Why Use Dynamic Inverse Control? 
•  How much do Neural Networks cost w.r.t. compute power? 
•  How can we certify a Neural Network? 
•  Some of these questions are NOT answered in this presentation  
General Neural Network 
Problem Statements Plus Others 
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Why Neural Networks? 
Neural Networks are Universal Approximators 
Minimizes a H2 norm 
They permit a nonlinear parameterization of uncertainty 
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Neurons in the human 
brain 
Neural networks simulate the activity of biological neurons within 
the human body.  Neural networks are implemented in an attempt to  
re-create the learning processes of the brain by recognizing patterns. 
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Multiple neurons 
For 1 neuron with 3 inputs: 
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Activation Function 
for fully connected 
neuron 
•  Activation function for one neuron is written mathematically in a 
general form as: 
Higher order terms 
Higher order terms increase the non-linear descriptive capability 
of the individual neurons within a neural network 
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Fully connected 
Higher Order Neural Network 
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Sigma-Pi is a sparsely  
Connected HONN 
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Failures 
Investigated 
2 groups of failures are “common” among aircraft mishaps/crashes.  
•  Aerodynamic Failures (A Matrix problems / lost aero surfaces, 
bent wings) 
•  Canard Failure (0.8 to -1.75 multiplier) 
•  Control Failures (B Matrix problems / jammed control surfaces) 
27 April, 2009 
Overview of Safety Monitors  
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Overview of new Safety 
Monitors 
•  Neural Net Limiter 
–  Designed to prevent high rate of change of NN 
commands and hard range limits 
–  Failure sets Sigma Pi disengage 
•  Loads Monitor 
–  Model of 40 loads locations on aircraft 
structure 
–  If any design limit loads (DLL) are exceeded, 
then disengage Sigma Pi  
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NN Limiter 
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Floating Limiter 
•  Requirements 
•  Design 
•  Simulation validation testing 
•  Summary 
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Specific Requirements 
•  Acceptance criteria 
–  + 2g vertical transient limit 
–  + 0.5g lateral transient limit 
–  Do not exceed specified load criteria 
•  Induce “worst case” D sigma pi error 
–  Stay within above limits 
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Design Approach 
•  Run safety monitors in FCS at 80hz 
•  All inputs to safety monitors are 
redundant (except beta, sigma pi) 
•  Tripped monitors will cause a downmode 
from sigma pi to conventional mode with a 
1 sec fader 
•  Causes for disengagement are 
instrumented on TM bus 
•  Safety monitor parameters are changeable 
from config files or recompile 
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Safety Monitor Constants set 
from Config File Method 
•  Purpose  
–  Change floating limiter or loads monitor constants without 
recompiling the SCE-3 code 
•  Method 
–  Load config files and checksum word in ARTS using PTC and 
transmit to FC via 1553 bus (multiplexed) 
–  FC will read data into memory and output data on FTDR bus 
upon command sequence from cockpit (ground operation 
only) 
–  FC will CCDL the checksum word to all 4 channels 
–  The FC will re-compute the config file checksum when the 
ENANCED mode is first engaged.   
–  If the checksum does not match the CCDL, the ENHANCED 
mode will be locked out and a CONFIG fail flag will be set 
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Floating Limiter Design 
•  Apply a floating limiter window for the 
sigma pi commands (P,Q,R) 
•  Maximum rate of change is allowed within 
the window 
•  Limit the rate of change while on the 
floating limiter boundary 
•  Allow full authority up to the range limiter 
•  Provide flags to sigma pi to stop learning 
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Max persistence ctr, 
downmode 
NN Floating Limiter 
Upper range limit (down mode) 
Lower range limit (down mode) 
Floating limiter 
Rate limit drift,  
start persistence 
counter 
Tunable metrics 
   Window delta 
   Drift rate 
   Persistence limiter 
   Range limits 
Window size 
Sigma pi cmd (pqr) 
Black – sigma pi cmd 
Green – floating limiter boundary 
Orange – limited command (fl_drift_flag) 
Red – down mode condition (fl_dmode_flag 
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Floating Limiter Regions 
Initial; no fail 
Transition 
Final; after fail 
Slow drift 
Moderate drift 
Fast drift 
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Loads Monitor 
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Loads Monitor Stations 
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V&V 
Verification 
•  Simulink Block Diagrams on NN 
•  Define I/O of NN signals 
•  Test for out of range for input signals 
•  Test for fault detection, identification, reversion logic 
•  Test NN with safety monitor to limit loads and G excursions 
•  Test loads and floating limiters 
•  Document test results 
Validation 
•  Perform Avionics System closed loop Interface test 
•  Perform closed loop 1553 bus I/O testing, data latency, sample 
rate   
•  Perform closed loop testing using input file from and compare 
results 
•  Evaluate transients from Adaptive to conventional mode 
•  Perform functional test plan & Flight Test. 
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Neural Network Flight Test Video 
[A] matrix failure with adaptation on and off during a 
1 g formation flight 
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Conclusions 
•  V&V for this project was by Limiting the size of 
the single string inputs from the ARTSII 
computer. 
•  We had 14 neural network trip outs due the the 
floating limiter. 
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Questions? 
